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Abstract
This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham Sandmo (1972) model of
income tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. The
strength of the norm is shaped endogenously, depending on the share of evaders in
the society. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative as their evasion depends on the
others’ compliance. We characterize the equilibrium which accounts for this interde-
pendence and study the implications for tax and enforcement policies. The analysis
is extended to the case of a society consisting of heterogenous communities. Individ-
ual evasion decisions are then embedded in a complex social structure and behavior
is influenced by the norm compliance among morale reference groups. Within this
framework, we highlight the role of belief management as an alternative policy tool.
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1 Introduction
In the past two decades, a huge body of empirical literature emerged which highlights the
importance of tax morale – taxpayers’ attitudes, perceptions and moral values – for indi-
vidual evasion decisions.1 Tax evasion seems to be more than a risky gamble of rational
individuals, who trade off the costs from detection with the chance of getting away un-
detected (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972).2 As expressed by Agnar Sandmo (2005, p.649),
“people refrain from tax evasion [...] not only from their estimates of the expected penalty,
but for reasons that have to do with social and morale considerations.’ ’ One crucial factor
which systematically influences such moral considerations is the (perceived) compliance of
other taxpayers. Individuals, who believe that most fellow citizens are honest, consider
evasion as a more serious wrongdoing than those, who presume tax evasion to be more
widespread.3 As recently discussed by Frey and Torgler (2007), this link appears to be
causal: higher expectations about the level of evasion trigger, ceteris paribus, a lower tax
morale.
In this paper we take up these findings and incorporates tax morale into Allingham
and Sandmo’s analysis of income tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as an internalized
social norm for tax compliance (Elster, 1989), which renders evasion ‘costly’. If a taxpayer
deviates from the norm and conceals income, conduct is not in line with the individual’s
self-image as a ‘good’ member of society, who complies with societal norms and expecta-
tions. The strength of the norm – and thereby the self-imposed sanctions associated with
a norm violation – is determined by two factors. First, by an exogenously given, individual
specific degree of norm internalization. Second, by the endogenously determined share of
evaders in the society. The more people deviate from the norm, the weaker the norm be-
comes. This creates an interdependency of evasion decisions. An increase in evasion will
trigger a bandwagon effect as it lowers the strength of the norm and thereby raises other
taxpayers’ disposition to dodge taxes. Hence, individuals act conditionally cooperative –
they condition their compliance on the behavior of other members of the society.4
We first discuss the policy implications of this framework for the case of a homogenous
society. In a next step, we extend our analysis to the case of a more structured society,
consisting of different subgroups. The strength of the social norm is not only determined by
the behavior among the own peers, but also by the compliance in other subgroups. Within
such a structured society, different communities can end up with quite different levels of
1See, e.g., Alm et al. (1992), Lewis (1982, 1986), Orviska and Hudson (2003), Torgler (2007) as well as
chapter 6 in Cowell (1990).
2See Andreoni et al. (1998) and Cowell (1990) for comprehensive discussions of the classical evasion
model.
3See, e.g., Frey and Torgler (2007), Porcano (1988), Spicer and Hero (1985).
4Ga¨chter (2006) provides a comprehensive survey of law as well as field evidence on conditional cooper-
ative behavior.
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tax compliance. Hence, this framework captures community specific ‘tax subcultures’, as
discussed in Lewis (1982). Moreover, we show that group specific policies may create
spillovers on other communities. The intuition for this result – which is, to the best of our
knowledge, novel in the literature – is that conditional cooperation works not only within
but also between groups.
If, for instance, looser tax enforcement among one specific group results in more evasion,
this creates an externality on the norm strength in other groups. The more a community
takes over the position of a social reference group, the more detrimental are norm violations
within this group on the perceived norm strength in the rest of the society. In order
to maintain a strong social norm, it is therefore crucial to enforce a high level of tax
compliance among ‘morale leaders’, i.e., members of moral reference groups. If the ‘leaders’
adhere to the norm, this will trigger conditional compliance among the ‘followers’. This
last result can be neatly linked to recent experimental evidence which studies the impact
of leader behavior in groups. Ga¨chter and Renner (2006), for example, show that higher
contributions by a leader (first-mover) in a sequential public good game make followers
expect higher levels of cooperation. In turn, this results in more contributions among
the followers. The importance of such a leader-follower interaction is also emphasized by
Hammar et al. (2009). They discuss a study by the Swedish Tax Agency which found
that “the most common argument legitimizing tax evasion among Swedens is that those in
leading positions in society violate the social norms” (p.5). This suggest that the recent
wave of high-profile evasion cases in Europe – e.g., the case of the former CEO of Germany’s
Deutsche Post AG, Klaus Zumwinkel – might have non-negligible impact on the overall level
of tax evasion. Our paper is the first which incorporates this aspect into the formal analysis
of tax evasion.
Compared to the standard model of tax evasion, we solve several shortcomings of the
latter. First, standard theory can not explain that a majority of households fully complies
with tax laws. As most fiscal systems are characterized by rather low audit rates and
penalties, a rational, immoral taxpayers with a reasonable degree of risk aversion should
conceal at least some income (Bernasconi, 1998). Obviously, we can account for the high
levels of compliance documented in many countries (Alm et al., 1992; Andreoni et al., 1998)
once we allow tax morale to play a role. Second, the Allingham Sandmo model can hardly
explain huge differences in tax compliance between countries or regions with comparable
monetary incentives for evasion. In terms of Rothstein (2000), standard theory fails to
explain why ‘Palermo is not Milan and Stockholm is not Moscow’. As noted above, the
evasion decisions in our model are interdependent, typically resulting in a multiplicity of
equilibria. An economy with a given tax and enforcement policy can either end up in a
state with a strong social norm, where most taxpayers pay all their taxes honestly, or a
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state with a weak social norm, where evasion is more widespread. In this vein, our analysis
provides an explanation to the ‘Palermo-Milano’ puzzle.
Thirdly, our model solves another weakness of the standard model. For decreasing
absolute risk aversion, the standard theory implies that higher taxes will lead to a lower
level of evasion (Yitzhaki, 1974). We demonstrate that this counterintuitive result – which is
also at odds with most empirical studies (e.g., Clotfelter, 1983) – vanishes, when individuals
are sufficiently sensitive to social norms. Finally, our framework also allows for quite unusual
responses to policy changes, if agents are not perfectly rational in the formation of their
beliefs about others’ behavior. If, for instance, a stricter deterrence policy is accompanied
by a shock in agents’ beliefs such that they expect a level of norm violations which is
above the true level, these initially false beliefs can become self-fulfilling. In the context of
multiple equilibria, stricter deterrence could then trigger more evasion. This finding also
points out the role of belief management as an important policy instrument (Fehr and Falk,
2002; Ga¨chter, 2006).
It is important to note that several existing contributions propose behavioral models
of tax evasion (Gordon, 1989; Myles and Naylor, 1996; Kim, 2003).5 Each of these papers
separately accounts for some of the problems of the standard theory highlighted above. As
discussed in more detail in section 2, however, our analysis combines and generalizes several
aspects of earlier models and provides entirely new results on the role of belief spillovers.
Kim (2003), for instance, studies the role of stigmatization. While the properties of his
framework are comparable to ours, he uses numerical simulations to show results that we can
derive analytically. A recent experimental study by Fortin et al. (2007) sketches a general
model of tax evasion and social interaction. The model is tailored to their experimental
design and the authors focus on testing it in the lab. A detailed formal analysis and a
discussion of policy implication, as it is presented in this paper, is beyond their focus. Myles
and Naylor (1996) consider a social custom of tax compliance. In contrast to our approach,
however, they assume that the disutility from a violation of the custom is independent
of the amount of evasion. This implies that those who cheat on taxes choose the level
of evasion predicted by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Hence, Myles and Naylor neither
capture heterogenous levels of non-compliance nor a positive relationship between the tax
rate and evasion.
The analysis from Gordon (1989) is most closely related to our study. As we will discuss
below, the preference structure considered in the present paper is less specific than the one
in Gordon. In addition, we provide a detailed examination of tax and deterrence policies in
the context of interrelated evasion decisions which is missing in Gordon. In particular, our
discussion of belief management is entirely novel in the tax evasion literature. Moreover,
we provide a tractable framework to study evasion in a multi-group setting, that allows for
5See also Bordignon (1993), Erard and Feinstein (1994).
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heterogeneity in income levels as well as group specific tax and enforcement policies. Non of
the other studies discusses the case of ‘tax subcultures’ or the spillover from group-specific
policies in a structured society.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present
the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model as well as several extensions of their approach.
Section 3 introduces a tax compliance norm and studies individual evasions behavior within
this framework. Section 4 solves for a social equilibrium with a heterogenous population.
In section 5, we extend our model to a society consisting of different subgroups and study
the impact of group specific policy measures. The paper concludes with the discussion of
policy implications.
2 Theories of tax evasion
2.1 The Allingham-Sandmo model
Following Allingham and Sandmo (1972) (hereafter labeled AS), we consider individuals
with an exogenous gross income y. Each taxpayer i decides on how much of this income
to declare and how much to conceal. Income concealed is labeled ei ∈ [0, y]. The declared
income, y−ei, gets taxed with a proportional income tax at rate τ . With a fixed probability
p the evasion gets detected. In this case, the tax evader has to pay the full taxes and a
penalty which is proportional to the taxes evaded (Yitzhaki, 1974). With probability 1− p
the evasion remains undetected and the evader only pays taxes on the declared income. The
corresponding levels of net income xi for state a – getting detected – or state b – escaping
undetected – are given by
xai = x
a(ei) = y − (y − ei) τ − τei − τeis = (1− τ) y − τeis
xbi = x
b(ei) = y − (y − ei) τ = (1− τ)y + τei
where s > 0 denotes the penalty rate. The expected (monetary) utility from evasion is
given by the von Neumann-Morgenstern
E [u(x(ei))] = p u (x
a(ei)) + (1− p) u(xb(ei)) (1)
with u′(x) > 0 and u′′(x) < 0. Agents choose e that maximizes expected utility. Note that
the decision is equivalent to an optimal portfolio choice problem, as individuals decide on
how much of their income to declare – and thereby invest in a safe asset – and how much
to conceal – invest in a risky asset. The first- and second-order condition to this problem
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are given by
E [u]′ ≡ −psτ u′(xa) + (1− p) τ u′(xb) = 0, (2)
E [u]′′ ≡ p(sτ)2 u′′(xa) + (1− p) τ 2 u′′(xb) < 0. (3)
Condition (2) characterizes eAS, the optimal level of income concealed. We will assume in
the following that such an interior solutions eAS ∈ [0, y] always exits.
Implicitly differentiating E [u]′ with respect to p and s, one can easily show that the level
of evasion decreases as tax enforcement becomes stricter, i.e., deAS/dp < 0 and deAS/ds < 0.
The effect of a marginal increase in τ is given by
deAS
dτ
=
(1− p) τ u′(xb) [(y − e) (ρ(xb)− ρ(xa))− e (s+ 1) ρ(xb)]
−E [u]′′ (4)
where we made use of (2) and the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, ρ (x) =
−u′′(x)/u′(x). For non-increasing absolute risk aversion (an assumption which is maintained
throughout the paper), there holds ρ′ ≤ 0 and thereby ρ(xai ) ≥ ρ(xbi). Hence, the sign in the
squared brackets in (4) is negative. We get the paradoxical result deAS/dτ < 0. According
to the AS-framework, taxpayers with constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion conceal
less income, if the tax rate rises. This counterintuitive finding is driven by the structure of
the fine. Here we follow Yitzhaki (1974), who assumes that the penalty is assessed on the
level of taxes evaded, rather than income concealed as in the original AS paper. An increase
in taxes will therefore raise both, the marginal gain from undetected evasion, i.e. taxes saved,
as well as the marginal costs associated with higher fines in the case of detection. In the
optimum, these two effects exactly offset each other. There is no substitution effect and the
impact of a tax increase on the optimal evasion level is solely driven by the income effect.
With decreasing absolute risk aversion, a rise in taxes will then reduce evasion, as a lower
income makes taxpayers less willing to bear risks.
2.2 Customs, stigma and social interaction
Several contributions have extended the classical portfolio choice model, considering an
additive preference structure of the form
U (ei) = E [u(ei)] + S(ei, .). (5)
While E [u(.)] represents the expected utility as defined in (1), S(.) is motivated by tax-
payers’ preferences over different non-pecuniary payoffs associated with tax evasion. The
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study of Gordon (1989) considers morality and reputation concerns. He studies the case of
SG = −ei (αi + β(1− n))
where αi ≥ 0 captures individual specific (marginal) moral or ‘psychic costs’ of concealing,
and β(1 − n), with a fixed β > 0, reflects (marginal) ‘reputation costs’. These costs are
linearly decreasing in n, the fraction of evaders in the society. Hence, it is less ‘costly’ to
conceal, the more other do so. The model presented in the next section will generalize the
structure from Gordon.
A similar approach is taken up in Myles and Naylor (1996). They analyze a social
custom for tax compliance, expressed by
SMN =
γi + δiR(n) for ei = 00 for ei > 0
with γi ≥ 0, δi ≥ 0 and R(n) ≥ 0. When taxpayers fully comply (ei = 0) they derive a
conformity payoff consisting of a fixed component, γi, and δiR(n). The authors assume
R′ < 0, arguing that it less attractive to follow the social custom the more people evade
taxes. The crucial distinction to Gordon’s model is that the conformity payoff is lost, once
a single Euro is underreported. The marginal non-pecuniary costs from evading a second
Euro are zero. Taxpayers who decide to evade will thus conceal eAS, the amount predicted
by the AS model. In contrast to AS, Myles and Naylor’s approach predicts more corner
solutions with ei = 0.
Kim (2003) focuses on the impact of stigmatization. He employs the functional form
SK = −pP (ei, 1− n)
with P (.) being increasing in both arguments and convex in ei. S
K reflects the expected
costs from stigmatization, which are decreasing in n and increasing in the detection proba-
bility p. Hence, taxpayers are assumed to be risk neutral regarding stigmatization costs but
risk averse over pecuniary payoffs. Note further, that Kim does not allow for heterogeneity
in P (.). Instead, he introduces heterogenous incomes which imply heterogenous levels of
underreporting.
The study in Fortin et al. (2007) sketches a more general structure, with
SFLV = −eiK(e¯−i, t¯−i, p¯−i, η).
The marginal non-pecuniary costs of underreporting income, K(.), depend – either pos-
itively or negatively – on the other taxpayers’ average level of evasion (e¯−i). Hence, the
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authors allow for either a ‘conformity’ or for an ‘anti-conformity’ effect. In addition, K(.) is
increasing in the average tax and auditing rate faced by others (t¯−i,p¯−i), capturing fairness
motives. Finally, the vector η contains individual and group specific characteristics that
might affect K(.). The structure considered by Fortin et al. is tailored to their experi-
mental set-up (e.g., assuming precise knowledge about the others’ evasion behavior). It is
concerned with interaction among a small, well-defined group rather than evasion in a large
society.
3 A social norm for tax compliance
Our approach focuses on the impact of tax morale on income underreporting. Tax morale is
modeled as an internalized social norm for tax compliance. Declaring all income correctly
is considered to be the ‘morally right’ behavior, while cheating on the taxes represents
a violation of a social norm. Each member of the society has internalized these moral
connotations to a certain degree. If a taxpayer conceals income, behavior is in conflict with
morals. Evasion is then accompanied by internal sanctions, associated with emotions like
guilt or remorse (Elster, 1989). The strength of these sanctions depends on the endogenous
strength of the norm. Following the literature (Akerlof, 1980, Lindbeck et al., 1999), we
assume that a norm is perceived as stronger, the more people adhere to it. If tax evasion
becomes more common, the social norm is less powerful and individuals’ costs to deviate
from the norm decline. It becomes easier for taxpayers to justify their wrong-doing to
themselves, the more other people violate the societies’ code of conduct.6
Preferences are represented by an additive structure as in (5), where
S(ei, n) = −θi ei c(n)
captures the ‘moral costs’ of tax evasion. These costs are assumed to depend on (i) θi ≥ 0,
the individual specific degree of norm internalization, as well as (ii) the continuous function
c(n) which captures the strength of the norm for a given share of evaders n. We assume
that 0 < c(n) < ∞ and c′(n) ≤ 0 for n ∈ [0, 1]. The more taxpayer deviate from the
norm, the lower are the moral costs of evasion. Moreover, (iii) the moral costs are linearly
increasing in ei, the amount of income concealed.
6This line of reasoning is supported by empirical evidence which shows that individuals consider tax
evasion more justifiable, the more they believe that other citizens cheat on taxes (Frey and Torger, 2007).
In contrast, the lab experiment by Fortin et al. (2007) does not find any significant interdependence between
evasion decisions. However, the authors themselves remark that the generalization of their findings to the
‘real’, non-lab context is unclear. This concern is in line with the field evidence from Fellner et al. (2009),
which suggests that people indeed condition their behavior on others’ compliance.
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The second assumptions generalizes the model in Gordon (1989), who implicitly assumes
c′(n) = −β. At the same time we just use one parameter, θi, which simplifies his two
parameter approach. Our third assumption, which is supported by evidence in, e.g., Aitken
and Bonneville (1980) and Lewis (1986), is equivalent to those made in Gordon (1989)
and Fortin et al. (2007), but different to Myles and Naylor (1996). Assuming a non-linear
relation as in Kim (2003) would only change our results quantitatively. Finally, note that
S(ei) does not depend on whether evasion is detected or not. Hence, in contrast to Kim
(2003), there is no risk associated with this latter payoff.
3.1 Optimal evasion decision
Taking the policy variables and the number of evaders n as given, an agent maximizes
E [u(ei)] + S(ei, n) with respect to ei.
7 The first order condition for an interior solution is
−psτ u′(xai ) + (1− p) τ u′(xbi) = θi c(n). (6)
The second order condition is equivalent to (3). As the left hand side of (6) equals E [u]′
from (2), we can express condition (6) as E [u]′ = θi c(n). Norm guided taxpayers will choose
a level of evasion such that the marginal expected utility equals θi c(n), the marginal moral
costs from concealing income. Homo oeconomicus does not care about norms or morals,
i.e., θi = 0. Such an agent chooses an optimal portfolio according to (2), increasing evasion
up to the point where the marginal expected utility is equal to zero. This yields the level of
evasion predicted by the AS framework, eAS. In contrast, taxpayers with high levels of θi
may be in a corner solution and refrain from evasion. Let us define the marginal expected
utility for the first unit of evasion,
z ≡ E [u (x(0))]′ = (1− p (1 + s)) τ u′ ((1− τ) y) , (7)
with z > 0.8 From (3) and (6) it follows that taxpayers with θic(n) > z do not conceal any
income. This implies the threshold
θˆ(n) ≡ z
c(n)
, (8)
7We focus on homogenous incomes levels – an assumption which could be easily relaxed at the cost of
analytical tractability (compare Kim, 2003). The case of heterogeneous incomes is studied in section 5.
8For z < 0 there would have to hold (1− p (1 + s)) < 0. If this were the case, evasion would not be
a ‘fair gamble’, in the sense that concealing income yields a negative expected return. The enforcement
policy would be deterrent, as no taxpayer would conceal any income.
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which allows us to characterize the optimal individual evasion behavior eˆi for a given level
of n:
eˆi =
0 for θi > θˆ(n)e∗i for θi ≤ θˆ(n) . (9)
Individuals with θi > θˆ(n) will stick to the compliance norm. On the other hand, those
with θi ≤ θˆ(n) will choose an interior solution e∗i according to condition (6). A graphical
representation of the optimal evasion level is provided below.
Figure 1: Optimal evasion with a social norm
Figure 1 pictures expected utility as well as the marginal moral costs of evasion on the
vertical axis against income concealed, plotted on the horizontal axis.9 While an agent with
θi = θˆ(n) will adhere to the compliance norm, taxpayers with θi = 0 will choose e
AS which
maximizes the expected utility E[u]. Individuals with 0 ≤ θi ≤ θˆ(n), however, will choose
an intermediate level of evasion, e∗i ∈ [0, eAS]. Note that e∗i depends – next to the policy
variables p, s, τ , income y and norm sensitivity θi – also on n, the share of evaders in a
society. Hence, evasion decisions are interdependent. Before we characterize an equilibrium
which accounts for this interdependency, we first provide a brief comparative static analysis.
9While in general E [u]′ is non-linearly decreasing in ei, we plotted a linear form for the sake of graphical
simplicity.
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3.2 Partial equilibrium analysis
Let us treat for the moment the frequency of evaders n as an exogenous variable. Applying
the implicit function theorem on (6), one obtains
∂e∗i
∂p
=
sτ u′(xai ) + τ u
′(xbi)
E [u]′′
< 0, (10)
∂e∗i
∂s
=
pτ (u′(xai )− sτe∗i u′′(xa))
E [u]′′
< 0, (11)
∂e∗i
∂θi
=
c(n)
E [u]′′
< 0, (12)
∂e∗i
∂n
=
θi c
′(n)
E [u]′′
≥ 0, (13)
with E [u]′′ as defined in (3). As in the AS framework, stricter enforcement will reduce
evasion. Increasing the penalty or the audit rate will induce agents to declare more income.
Next to the formal tax enforcement institution also the social norm has a deterrent effect.
An exogenous shock in the norm sensitivity θi will result in a lower level of evasion. In
terms of figure 1, the θic(n) line would shift upwards and e
∗
i would decline. Furthermore,
(13) shows that taxpayers condition their evasion on the behavior of others. As more
people evade taxes, agents with 0 < θi ≤ θˆ(n) react by concealing more income. The more
taxpayers deviate from the compliance norm, the weaker is the social norm, the lower are
the moral cost of concealing. In this sense, any new tax evader creates a positive externality
on all other cheaters – it makes their wrong-doing more justifiable, and thereby provides
an incentive to evade more. From (8) we can derive
∂θˆ(n)
∂n
= −θˆ(n)c
′(n)
c(n)
≥ 0 (14)
since c′(n) ≤ 0. With a higher level of n, the compliance threshold θˆ(n) rises. Some
agents with θi ≥ θˆ(n), who used to refrain from evasion, will start to conceal income after
an increase in n. These taxpayers condition their compliance with the tax law on the
behavior of others. They act as conditional cooperative taxpayers. We will elaborate on the
implications of this behavior in the following section.
Let us now turn to the impact of a tax increase. From (6) we obtain
∂e∗i
∂τ
=
1
−E [u]′′
{
θi c(n)
τ
+ psτ u′′(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− (1− p) τ u′′(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
. (15)
Note that for θi = 0 the first term in the curly brackets is zero, and the right hand side
is equivalent to the effect derived in the AS framework, depicted in (4). In this case, we
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would get ∂e∗i /∂τ < 0. However, for positive values of θi the result might turn around. In
appendix A1, we derive from (15) a threshold θ˜(n), such that
∂e∗i
∂τ
 ≥ 0 for θi ≥ θ˜(n)< 0 for θi < θ˜(n) (16)
While for low levels of θi the counterintuitive effect from the AS model carries over to
our framework, the result turns around for agents with a sufficient strong tax morale. As
θi > θ˜(n) we get the more plausible result that tax evasion increases with a higher tax
rate. Moreover, in the appendix we show that θ˜(n) is increasing in the levels of norm
deviations. The lower the share of tax evaders in the society, the lower is θ˜(n) and thereby
∂e∗i /∂τ ≥ 0 holds for a broader range of θ-values. Note, however, that non-increasing
absolute risk aversion implies θ˜(n) > 0. Hence, there is always a range θ ∈ [0, θ˜(n)] where
the counterintuitive comparative static from AS carries over to our framework.
The intuition for this finding is straightforward. As we have discussed above, a tax in-
crease will raise the marginal benefits from evasion, as well as the marginal costs (associated
with higher expected fines). For the optimal evasion level predicted by AS these two effects
offset each other. There is no substitution effect and the income effect from higher taxation
triggers a reduction in the evasion level. In our context we observe a positive substitution
effect for all agents with θi > 0 (depicted in the first term in the curly brackets in (15)).
These agents will choose an evasion level such that E [u]′ > 0. Marginal expected benefits
from concealing are above marginal expected costs. In terms of optimal portfolio choice,
moral taxpayers ‘over-invest’ in the safe asset – they conceal too little and declare too much
income. Any increase in the tax rate then raises the wedge between marginal expected ben-
efits and cost even further. This raises marginal expected utility E [u]′ for all agents with
θi > 0 (or e
∗
i < e
AS). As we have assumed moral costs of evasion to depend on income
concealed rather than taxes evaded, these costs are not affected by a tax change. Hence,
the substitution effect provides a clear incentive to increase evasion.10 While the negative
income effect is still present, the positive substitution effect dominates for θi > θ˜(n). For
these agents, tax evasion increases as taxes rise. Note that this result is not new in the
literature. Our analysis solely replicates the result from Gordon (1989) in a more compact
framework.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the partial equilibrium effects associated
with an increase in the tax rate. From the definition of z one can easily derive ∂z/∂τ > 0
and from the AS model we know that E [u]′ evaluated at eASi is decreasing in the tax rate.
10If moral costs would depend on the level of taxes evaded, a higher tax rate would also raise the evasion
costs. As long as the increase in marginal expected utility dominates the increase in costs, we would still
observe a raise in the evasion level for some levels of θ.
11
Figure 2: Partial equilibrium effect of a tax increase
Hence, the E [u]′ curve turns clockwise as we increase τ , with the turning-point somewhere
between eASi and ei = 0. (This implies 0 < θ˜(n) < θˆ.) The intersection of the marginal
expected utility curve before and after the change in the tax rate defines the threshold
θ˜(n). In the example from figure 2, individuals with θi < θ˜(n) will reduce evasion as the
tax rate raises. The taxpayer with θ1 > θ˜(n), however, will conceal more income. The
largest increase in underreporting will be observed for the taxpayer with θi = θˆ, who did
not evade before the tax increase. Moreover, taxpayer 2, who has been paying all taxes
honestly before the tax increase, will switch to an interior solution after the policy change.
From this example one can also see that a change in one policy variable typically has an
impact on the share of evaders. In the following we study this effect in an equilibrium
framework.
4 Social equilibrium
We consider a continuum population with unit mass. The norm parameter θ is distributed
according to a continuously differentiable, cumulative distribution function F (θ) which has
full support on the interval [0, θ¯]. The corresponding density function is f(θ) and the inverse
of the distribution function is denoted F−1(n). As we know from (9), people choose to evade
taxes if θi ≤ θˆ(n). The equilibrium population share of evaders n∗ is then given by the
fixed-point equation
n∗ = F
(
z
c(n∗)
)
(17)
The right hand side of (17) is a continuous function in n, mapping the compact interval [0, 1]
into itself. Assuming θ¯c(1) ≥ z assures that there always exists at least one asymptotically
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stable equilibrium n∗ ∈ (0, 1],11 where stability requires
∂F−1(n)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n∗
≥ ∂θˆ(n)
∂n
∣∣∣∣∣
n∗
. (18)
For an exogenous policy P =(τ, p, s), an equilibrium characterizes a self supporting share
of evaders. For n∗, the strength of the norm is such that a population share of 1 − n∗
will declare their income honestly whereas the remaining n∗ will choose an interior solution
e∗i as characterized by (6). While there is at least one solution to (17), the system is
typically characterized by a multiplicity of equilibria. Such a case is illustrated in figure 3.
If evasion has become prevalent, the compliance norm has practically eroded and society
finds itself in an equilibrium where nearly everybody cheats on taxes. For the same policy
P and distribution F (θ), however, the society could in principle coordinate on a different
equilibrium, where most agents adhere to the norm. The social norm would be stronger
and the level of tax evasion in the society would be smaller.
Figure 3: Social equilibrium – impact of a tax increase
In figure 3 we plot the share of norm violators n on the horizontal axis against the
degree of norm internalization θ and the threshold θˆ(n), respectively, on the vertical axis.
In the example, we consider a uniform distributed of θ.12 The shape of θˆ(n) is defined
by the function c(n). In figure 3 there are two asymptotically stable equilibria – a ‘good’
one, where only a small fraction n∗l deviates from the norm and a ‘bad’ equilibrium with
11The existence of an equilibrium hinges on θ¯ ≥ θˆ(1) as well as θˆ(0) > 0. Note, that an equilibrium with
n∗ = 0 is not supported, as we allow for taxpayers with θi = 0 who always choose to evade eAS > 0 for any
level of n.
12Note that in Gordon’s (1998) analysis, there is no scope for a multiplicity of equilibria under a uniform
distribution. This is due to assuming a linear relationship between SG and n.
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widespread evasion, n∗h. Between these two stable equilibria, there is a third, unstable one,
with n∗m. Such an unstable equilibrium marks the boundary of a stable equilibriums’ basin
of attraction. In our example, society would converges into the good equilibrium, starting
from any share n ∈ [0, n∗m], or into the bad equilibrium, for any n ∈ [n∗m, 1]. We will come
back to this point in section 4.2.
4.1 Equilibrium effect of policy changes
Let us turn to the equilibrium effect from an increase in the tax rate. As we addressed above,
individuals with θi > θˆ(n) may switch from a corner solution to an interior solution after a
tax increase. These new evaders will weaken the social norm, moral costs of evasion decline
and further taxpayers will start concealing income. The equilibrium effect is captured by an
upward shift of the θˆ(n)-curve in figure 3: the marginal expected utility from concealing the
first unit of income increases (∂z/∂τ > 0). Accordingly, the evasion threshold θˆ(n) rises for
any n which results in an increase in the stable equilibrium share of evaders. Analytically,
we can derive this from (17) and get
dn∗
dτ
> 0 (19)
for any stable equilibrium (see appendix A2). The equilibrium impact on the optimal level
of evasion is then given by
de∗i
dτ
=
∂e∗i
∂τ
+
∂e∗i
∂n
dn∗
dτ
(20)
with ∂e∗i /∂n and ∂e
∗
i /∂τ from (13) and (15), respectively. As shown by (16), the sign of
the first order effect is ambiguous and depends on the norm parameter θi. In contrast, the
second order effect is unambiguously positive for all θi > 0. We can derive a new threshold
θ˜∗(n∗) (see appendix A2) such that
de∗i
dτ
 ≥ 0 for θi ≥ θ˜∗(n∗)< 0 for θi < θ˜∗(n∗) (21)
In equilibrium, there are now two effects which tend to raise evasion. First, there is a
positive substitution effect, discussed in the partial equilibrium analysis above. Second,
a tax increase is accompanied by an increase in the equilibrium share of norm breaking
individuals. This second effect lowers the moral cost of evasion and thereby provides a
further incentive to conceal more income. For taxpayers with θi ≥ θ˜∗(n∗) these two effects
dominate the negative income effect – they will react with more evasion on an increase in
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the tax rate. From this discussion also follows that θ˜∗ < θ˜ for any n∗.13 Hence, compared
to the partial equilibrium analysis, de∗i /dτ ≥ 0 holds for a broader range of θ-values.
Regarding the enforcement variables s and p we derive in appendix A2 that there holds
dn∗
dp
< 0,
dn∗
ds
< 0 (22)
in any stable equilibrium. As the deterrence policy becomes stricter, the marginal expected
utility from evasion – and therewith z – falls and the threshold θˆ(n) decreases (compare (7)
and (8), respectively). The θˆ(n)-curve shifts downward and the population share of evaders
drops. Using (22), we then get the equilibrium impact of a stricter enforcement policy,
de∗i
dp
=
∂e∗i
∂p
+
∂e∗i
∂n
dn∗
dp
< 0, (23)
de∗i
ds
=
∂e∗i
∂s
+
∂e∗i
∂n
dn∗
ds
< 0 (24)
In addition to the first-order effects ∂e∗i /∂p and ∂e
∗
i /∂s from (10) and (11), respectively,
the deterrence policy now has a second effect. As auditing becomes more frequent or if the
penalty rates increases, the resulting drop in the share of evaders makes the social norm
for tax compliance stronger – the moral costs of tax evasion increase. This will trigger a
further reduction in the level of evasion. Hence, in our framework, the equilibrium impact
of tax enforcement is stronger than suggested by the partial equilibrium analysis and the
AS model.14
4.2 Beliefs and multiple equilibria
So far, we have considered the case where a (marginal) policy change results in a marginal
adjustment of n∗. In the context of multiple equilibria, however, this is not necessarily
true. Our analysis implicitly assumes (a) that there always exists a stable equilibrium in
the close neighborhood of the previous one and (b) that society indeed coordinates on this
particular equilibrium. The first assumption is fulfilled, as long as the stability condition
from (18) holds with strict inequality. Regarding the second point, one could argue that
– at least for minor policy changes – an equilibrium which is ‘proximate’ to the former
one is more salient than an alternative, more distant equilibrium. Following this line of
reasoning, the equilibrium in the neighborhood of the previous one becomes a focal point
13As this new effect is strictly positive, de∗i /dτ > 0 also holds when the income dominates the substitution
effect.
14An equivalent result would be obtained with the assumptions from Fortin et al. (2007) (reflected in
SFLV from section 2.2). When agents condition their compliance on e¯−i rather than n, however, we would
predict a different equilibrium effect from a tax increase since the aggregate effect of higher tax rate on e¯−i
are in general ambiguous.
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equilibrium (Schelling 1960). If this is the case, (19)–(24) provide the valid marginal effects
of the policy variables. If assumption (b) is violated one might obtain different results.
To illustrate this point, assume that individual behavior is based on beliefs rather than
the true level of norm-violations. Let us denote a taxpayer’s belief about n at time t by
bti = b(n
t−1, φt−1i ,P).
15 Beliefs depend on the past level of norm violations, the policy P,
as well as a parameter φt−1i which captures individual specific perceptions at time t − 1.
We assume ∂bt/∂nt−1 > 0 and ∂bt/∂φt−1 > 0. Hence, with a ‘positive’ shock in beliefs,
φt−1i > 0, a taxpayer tends to overestimate the level of evaders and vice versa for a ‘negative’
shock, φt−1i < 0. In equilibrium there holds φ
t−1
i = 0 and b
t
i = b(n
∗, 0,P) = n∗ ∀i. It is
worth noting that – in the absence of shocks – beliefs would always adapt such that they
would be fulfilled in the long run, i.e., bti = n
∗ as t→∞. Starting from any off-equilibrium
level n within the basin of attraction of a particular, stable equilibrium (e.g., n ∈ [0, n∗m]
for equilibrium n∗l in figure 3), the updating of beliefs based upon n
t−1 will lead the society
towards this equilibrium.
Consider now the case where stricter tax enforcement – for instance, an increase in
the auditing frequency – is announced at period t. Assume first, that there is no shock
on agents’ beliefs (φti = 0). Starting from an equilibrium n
∗
0, perfectly informed taxpayer
would adjust their behavior according to the new, weaker evasion incentives. The level of
evaders drops, and so will agents’ beliefs in the following period. The social norm becomes
stronger, providing a further incentive to reduce evasion. Society gradually move towards
the new stable equilibrium n∗1 < n
∗
0. This case is illustrated in figure 4. Stricter enforcement
shifts the θˆ(n)-curve downwards which reduces the level of non-compliance in any stable
equilibrium.
Let us now allow for shocks in beliefs. More frequent audits are announced ‘as a response
to the high level of non-compliance’ and some agents take this as a signal that the current
evasion level is higher than originally believed, φti > 0. If their ‘mistake’ φ
t
i is large enough,
their belief in t + 1, after the policy change P → P′, fulfills bt+1i (n∗0, φti,P′) > b(n∗0, 0,P).
Hence, these agents perceive an increase in the level of norm deviations. The compliance
norm becomes weaker which provides an incentive to conceal more rather than less income.
Given that this latter incentive dominates the direct effect from stricter auditing, the num-
ber of evaders would raise among those with φti > 0. As a result, we might observe an
overall increase in norm violations, i.e., nt+1 > n∗0.
Society would nevertheless converge towards the equilibrium n∗1, if n
t+1 is still within
the basin of attraction of the equilibrium n∗1 (and if no further shocks occurs, i.e., φ
t+1
i =
φt+2i = ... = 0). In a society with many stable equilibria, however, each equilibrium’s basin
of attraction becomes relatively small. Already minor shocks could then be sufficient to
15Allowing for heterogeneity in beliefs is not crucial for the following discussion. One could simply
consider bt = b(nt−1, φt−1,P).
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push nt+1 into the attraction area of a different equilibrium. In figure 4 it would be sufficient
if nt+1 > n∗m. If norm violations after the shock overshoot this level (the upper limit of
the basin to n∗1), society converges towards the stable equilibrium n
∗
2 – an equilibrium with
more evaders than before the policy change.16
Figure 4: Response to stricter enforcement – belief shocks
As this thought experiment shows, stricter tax enforcement can trigger more evaders,
such that the results from (22) turn around. This also renders the enforcement variables’
impact on the actual level of evasion ambiguous. The negative direct effect from an increase
in p or s, depicted in the first terms on the RHS of (23) and (24) respectively, would work
against the positive effect from a weakening of the social norm, related to an increase norm-
violations. For evaders with a high norm-sensitivity θ, the latter effect is more likely to
dominate the deterrence incentives.
As we have seen, policy adjustments in the context of multiple equilibria can trigger
counterintuitive behavioral responses, once we allow for belief shocks. The original incentive
related to a policy change are more likely to be turned around, either if shocks are large
or in the case where many stable equilibria exist. The immediate policy implication of
this discussion is straightforward: Taxpayers’ beliefs matter! Hence, the management of
these beliefs become a policy tool. New policies should therefore be communicated in a
way which either tries to avoid shocking beliefs at all or tries to shape beliefs in a direction
which supports the policy change. Turning back to the example from above, it might be
more efficient to announce increased auditing efforts as a means ‘to further improve the
high level of compliance’ rather than as response to ‘a recent increase in tax evasion’. More
generally we can conclude that any policy action that leaves economic incentives (reflected
16See Borck (2004) for a political economy approach which shows that stricter enforcement may increase
tax evasion.
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in P) unaffected, but nevertheless shocks belief ‘downwards’ (φt−1i < 0) will contribute to
maintain or even increase overall tax compliance. We will come back to the impact of belief
management in the following section.
5 Social structure and inter-group spillovers
This section extends our basic framework and analyzes a more complex structure of society.
In particular, we consider a population consisting of M ≥ 2 subgroups. One could think of
these groups as local communities or social classes with similar education, income or social
status. In the following we focus on the case where individuals within a group j ∈ {1, ...,M}
have the same income yj and face the same policy Pj = (τj, pj, sj). The net income of agent
i from group j for the case of detected or undetected evasion is then given by
xaij = x
a
j (eij) = (1− τj) yj − τjeijsj and xbij = xbj(eij) = (1− τj)yj + τjeij,
respectively, and preferences are described by
Uj (eij) = E [u(eij)]− θij eij
M∑
k=1
αjk c(nk) (25)
with
E [u(eij)] = pj u(x
a
j (eij)) + (1− pj) u(xbj(eij)),∑
k
αjk = 1 ∀j (26)
and nk ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share of evaders in group k ∈ {1, ...,M}. In (25) we allow the
moral costs of evasion to depend upon the compliance behavior in the own as well as other
groups of society. The parameter αjk ∈ [0, 1) thereby captures the sensitivity of the norm
strength in community j with respect to norm deviations in group k. We exclude the special
case αjj = 1, i.e., where the norm is group specific in the sense that its’ strength depends
exclusively on the behavior within the own group. Hence, there always exists (at least) one
subgroup k 6= j with αjk > 0 which works as a moral role model or moral reference group
for agents from j.17
17If moral costs were shaped by the pattern of direct social interactions we could relate αjk to the degree
of population segregation or viscosity (Myerson et al., 1991). If αjk is high, the interaction frequency
between types from groups j and k is high.
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5.1 Optimal evasion and social equilibrium
Assuming that communities are large and policies as well as non-compliance levels are taken
as given, individuals choose eij in order to maximize (25). Analogously to (6), the first order
condition for an interior solution is
−pjsjτj u′(xaij) + (1− pj) τj u′(xbij) = θij
∑
k
αjk c(nk). (27)
The threshold for an interior solution becomes
θˆj(nj, n−j) =
zj∑
k αjk c(nk)
(28)
with zj ≡ (1− pj (1 + sj)) τj u′ ((1− τj) yj) > 0 and n−j = (n1, . . . , nj−1, nj+1, . . . , nM).
For θij ≤ θˆj(nj, n−j), condition (27) characterizes the optimal evasion level e∗ij. All agents
with θij above this threshold are in a corner solution and fully comply with tax laws.
We can now describe a social equilibrium for a society structured in M groups. Let the
degree of norm internalization within each group be distributed according to a continuously
differentiable, cumulative distribution function Fj(θ) with θij ∈ [0, θ¯] and the inverse F−1j
is well defined on the unit interval. A social equilibrium is then characterized by (n∗j , n
∗
−j)
with
n∗j = Fj(θˆj(n
∗
j , n
∗
−j) ∀j (29)
and stability is given iff
∂F−1j
∂nj
∣∣∣∣∣
nj=n∗j
≥ dθˆj(nj, n−j)
dnj
∣∣∣∣∣
nj=n∗j ,n−j=n
∗
−j
∀j. (30)
Assuming that θˆj(1, n−j) < θ¯ holds for n−j = (1, ..., 1), there always exists at least one
stable equilibrium.18
The analysis of section 4 focussed on one equilibrium associated with a homogenous
norm strength for the whole society. The extended framework now allows for equilibria
where the perceived strength of the social norm and compliance behavior strongly differs
between heterogeneous subgroups of society. In particular, social structure and inter-group
links can support social equilibria where some groups predominantly cheat on taxes while
most members of other communities act according to the norm. The model thereby captures
what Lewis (1982, p.144) described as different coexisting ‘tax subcultures’.
18As c(0) is finite, there holds θˆj(0, n−j) > 0 for all n−j . This implies the existence of a stable social
equilibrium.
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5.2 Policy spillovers and belief leadership
We now study the impact of policy changes within this extended framework. To simplify
exposition we consider a society with only two groups,M = 2. Let us first study an increase
in the tax rate for group j. As before, one can show that
dn∗j
dτj
> 0 (31)
holds in any stable equilibrium.19 A tax increase still induces more people to cheat on taxes.
However, a higher level of n∗j now has a negative impact on the perceived norm strength in
the other group k 6= j and thereby triggers further norm deviations. In particular, we get
from (29)
dn∗k
dn∗j
> 0. (32)
As taxpayers condition their compliance also on the behavior in the other group, norm
deviations within j create a spillover on community k.
The adjustment in evasion among members from the subgroup targeted by the tax
increase is given by
de∗ij
dτj
=
∂e∗ij
∂τj
+
(
∂e∗ij
∂nj
+
∂e∗ij
∂nk
dn∗k
dn∗j
)
dn∗j
dτj
. (33)
One can derive the partial equilibrium effects ∂e∗ij/∂τj and ∂e
∗
ij/∂nj > 0 analogously to the
ones presented in section 4. The impact of an increase in τj on the evasion level of agents
from group j is similar as before. Next to the direct impact on the monetary incentives to
evade, higher taxes will raise the share of norm violations within the own group. In turn, the
compliance level in the other subgroup will decrease as well. With a higher share of evaders
in both communities the strength of the social norm declines. Since ∂e∗ij/∂nk ≥ 0, this
provides a similar second order incentive to increase e∗ij as discussed in the previous section.
In addition, however, the group specific tax policy creates an externality on compliance in
the other group:
de∗ik
dτj
=
(
∂e∗ik
∂nj
+
∂e∗ik
∂nk
dn∗k
dn∗j
)
dn∗j
dτj
≥ 0. (34)
Although the change in the tax rate does not alter the monetary incentives of these taxpay-
ers, they react with an increase in evasion. As more taxpayers from the other community
start cheating, tax morale among the own peers – and thereby compliance – drops as well.
Again, this result is triggered by conditional cooperative taxpayers. In the basic framework
this effect occurred within one group – a homogenous society. Now it works between differ-
ent subgroups of the population. As a consequence, any group specific policy change will
19All results of this section are derived in appendix A3.
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causes a spillover on other communities within the society. The magnitude of the external-
ity from a change in policy Pj on the level of evasion in group k 6= j is determined by the
social role a community k plays for the members of j. The higher is αjk, the more weight
is attributed to the behavior of agents from k in determining tax morale within group j,
the stronger is the spillover. Hence, the more a group works as a moral reference group for
others, the more crucial are norm violations among that group.20
This observation has several important implications. First, the behavior of those with
high social and moral prestige can have a huge impact on tax compliance in the rest of the
population. Empirical evidence which supports this conjecture is discussed by Hammar et
al. (2009). They report on a study by the Swedish Tax Agency which found that “the most
common argument legitimizing tax evasion among Swedens is that those in leading positions
in society violate the social norms” (p.5).
Second, the spillovers provide new arguments for optimal policy choice. A revenue max-
imizing enforcement policy, for example, should ceteris paribus devote more resources on
auditing members from moral reference groups. Enforcing high levels of compliance among
these groups creates strong, positive spillovers and thereby yields high tax revenues. Fur-
thermore, the spillovers could also present a limitation for optimal redistributive taxation.
Given that social prestige is associated with higher incomes, the analysis suggests that
taxing the rich could also cause a decline in tax morale and therewith compliance in the
rest of the society. This argument could turn around if fairness aspects also contribute to
tax morale (compare footnote 20). A thorough analysis of this tradeoff is left for further
research.
Note further that the ‘leading groups’ in a society are typically rather small. Hence,
the norm violations of a few could lead to a sharp erosion of tax morale within the whole
society. We could easily find examples where rather small shifts in the behavior within
a moral reference group eliminate the existence of ‘good’ equilibria (with a high level of
norm compliance) for other subgroups. Some few tax evasion cases among ‘morale leaders’
– societies’ high-profile members like politicians or top-level CEOs – could then shift a bulk
of the population from an equilibrium state with a large extent of tax compliance to a state
with widespread evasion. This suggests that the recent wave of high-profile evasion cases in
Europe (e.g., Germany’s Zumwinkel case) could have a non-negligible impact on the overall
level of tax compliance.
The crucial role of leadership is also highlighted by recent experimental studies. For
instance, Ga¨chter and Renner (2006) show how contributions of a leader (first-mover) in a
20Note that very similar results would be obtained if one allows for inter-group fairness preferences
regarding a fair tax or auditing rate for group k. One could incorporate these aspects by a function
c(n,Pj ,Pk), which depends on the policies for the different groups. This extension, which is also proposed
by Fortin et al. (2007), is left for future research.
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sequential public good game affect the followers’ beliefs and thereby their behavior. Higher
contributions by the leaders make followers expect higher levels of cooperation which trig-
gers more contributions among conditional cooperators. Similar evidence is discussed in
Arbak and Villeval (2007). Hence, these studies provide evidence pointing out the role of
belief leadership as one possible way to manage beliefs (Fehr and Falk, 2002; Ga¨chter 2006).
6 Conclusion
In order to design appropriate policies to ensure tax compliance, it is essential to carefully
examine taxpayers’ motivation to comply with tax laws. This paper studies the incentives
related to tax morale, interpreted as a social norm for compliance. Empirical evidence sug-
gests that the taxpayers’ inclination to cheat on taxes depends on the (perceived) behavior
of their fellow citizens. The more others evade taxes, the easier it is justifiable to conceal
income. In this vein, individual decisions become interdependent. Taxpayers act condi-
tionally cooperative: they condition their compliance on the behavior of other members of
society.
Our framework improves upon the classical tax evasion model in several respects. We
can explain high levels of compliance despite weak tax enforcement. As an endogenous
norm strength typically implies the existence of multiple equilibria, the model also allows
for different levels of evasion for one fixed monetary incentive to conceal income. In a soci-
ety which consists of several distinct communities, this implies the possibility of different,
coexisting tax subcultures. Finally, our approach also allows for a positive and thereby
more intuitive relation between tax rates and the level of evasion.
Next to the assessment of conventional fiscal policy variables, our analysis also offers a
formal discussion of belief management. In a world of conditional cooperative taxpayers,
not only monetary incentives but also individual beliefs regarding others’ behavior shape the
evasion decision. Any policy measure which corroborates beliefs in high compliance levels
thus forms a potentially important policy instrument. Belief leadership constitutes one tool
to manage beliefs. As we have analyzed for the case of a structured, multi-group society,
the norm compliance in moral reference groups is of crucial importance for tax morale in
many other communities. If ‘moral leaders’ such as politicians or high-profile CEOs start
to violate the norm, strong detrimental spillovers on the perceived norm strength in the
whole society can occur. Our analysis thus suggests that the recent wave of prominent
tax evasion cases in Germany or the (what is considered to be) ‘unmoral behavior’ among
members of Gordon Brown’s government could cause substantially negative effects on the
behavior of norm guided taxpayers. Enforcing high levels of compliance among ‘leaders’
seems essential to ensure compliance among the large fraction of ‘followers’ in a society.
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The applicability of belief management was recently demonstrated by Fellner et al. (2009).
In a natural field experiment, they sent mailings to 50.000 potential evaders of a specific
fee (TV licence fees) and measured how many started to pay the fee in response to different
treatments. Among others, they compared the effect of a benchmark letter with that from
an information letter which informed about the high level of compliance. Their evidence
suggests that – within the sample of individuals who were surprised by the high compliance
rate – the information letter was more successful in raising compliance than the benchmark.
This finding indicates the potential of belief management as a attractive, complementary
enforcement strategy. Clearly, further research is needed to study scope and limits of this
new policy tool.
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Appendix
A1. Appendix to section 3
From (16) we can easily derive
θ˜(n) =
−τ 2
c(n)
{
ps u′′(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− (1− p) u′′(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
. (A.1)
Using ρ (x), the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, rearranging and substituting
for (6), we get
θ˜(n) =
(1− p) τ 2u′(xbi)
{
ρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− ρ(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
c(n) (1 + τρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i ))
> 0. (A.2)
Non-increasing absolute risk aversion is sufficient for θ˜(n) > 0 to hold, since from ρ′(x) ≤ 0
follows that ρ(xai ) ≥ ρ(xbi). Note further that c′(n) ≤ 0 implies ∂θ˜(n)/n ≥ 0.
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A2. Appendix to section 4
Applying the implicit function theorem on (17) yields
dn∗
dp
=
− (1 + s) τ u′ ((1− τ) y) 1
c(n)
∂F−1
∂n
− ∂θˆ(n)
∂n
< 0. (A.3)
where we used (7) to derive ∂z/∂p. As we know from (18), the denominator must be
positive in a stable equilibrium. This determines the sign of (A.3).
Following the same steps as before, we get
dn∗
ds
=
−pτ u′ ((1− τ) y) 1
c(n)
∂F−1
∂n
− ∂θˆ(n)
∂n
< 0, (A.4)
dn∗
dτ
=
∂z
∂τ
1
c(n)
∂F−1
∂n
− ∂θˆ(n)
∂n
> 0 (A.5)
with
∂z
∂τ
= (1− p (1 + s)) [u′ ((1− τ) y)− τy u′′ ((1− τ) y)] > 0. (A.6)
Equilibrium threshold θ˜∗(n∗). Substituting for (13) we can express (20) as
de∗i
dτ
=
1
−E [u]′′
{
θi c(n
∗)
τ
+ psτ u′′(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− (1− p) τ u′′(xbi) (y − e∗i )− θi c′(n∗)
dn∗
dτ
}
.
(A.7)
The sign of the expression is determined by the term in the curly brackets. Using ρ (x) and
(6), we get the threshold
θ˜∗(n∗) =
(1− p) τ 2 u′(xbi)
{
ρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− ρ(xbi) (y − e∗i )
}
c(n∗)
(
1 + τρ(xai ) (y + se
∗
i )− τ c
′(n∗)
c(n∗)
dn∗
dτ
) . (A.8)
For θi > θ˜
∗(n∗) the term in the curly brackets is positive and hence de∗i /dτ > 0. Finally,
we compare this threshold with the partial equilibrium threshold, θ˜(n∗) from (A.2). As
the numerator of (A.2) and (A.8) are the same, but the denominator of (A.8) is bigger,
it immediately follows that θ˜ > θ˜∗ for any n∗. Moreover, from (A.5) also follows that the
denominator of (A.8) is strictly positive. Therefore θ˜∗(n∗) > 0.
24
A3. Appendix to section 5
From (28) and (29) we can derive
dn∗j
dτj
=
∂zj
∂τj
(
∑
k αjk c(n
∗
k))
2
(
F ′j(θˆj)
)−1
+ zjαjjc′(n∗j)
> 0. (A.9)
From (30) we know that in any stable equilibrium the denominator must be positive. As
∂zj/∂τj > 0, we get dn
∗
j/dτj > 0.
Implicitly differentiating (29) further yields
dn∗j
dn∗k
=
−zj αjkc′(n∗k)
(
∑
k αjk c(n
∗
k))
2
(
F ′j(θˆj)
)−1
+ zjαjjc′(n∗j)
> 0 (A.10)
as the denominator must be positive in any stable equilibrium. Given that c′(n∗k) < 0,
dn∗j/dn
∗
k is strictly positive as long as αjk > 0. Since we assume αjj < 1, this always holds
in the case of two groups due to (26).
Finally, from the first order condition (27) we obtain
∂e∗ij
∂nk
=
θij αjkc
′(nk)
E [uj]
′′ ≥ 0. (A.11)
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